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Abstract
The empirical relationship between the remuneration of: the highest paid director 
(HPD), mean Board remuneration (Director), and the Chairperson of the Board 
(Chair) and firm-level performance is examined on a panel of mutual building 
societies over the 1991 to 1996 period. Two measures of performance are employed: 
profitability and the change in total factor productivity (TFP). A strong positive 
relationship between profitability and pay is found for the HPD but not for the 
Director or Chair. The relationship between pay and TFP change is generally weak for 
all three measures of executive remuneration. A strong relationship between size and 
the executive remuneration measures is found, particularly for the Director. Although 
there is evidence of pay being used as a governance device, the pay-size relationship 
is consistent with managerial theories of the firm. Surprisingly, our results are similar 
to those reported for joint stock firms. 3
1. Introduction
A key principal-agent relationship within firms is that between owners and managers. 
Within the corporate governance literature research has focused on how to attenuate 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers that is not in owners’ interests. Executive 
remuneration is a potentially potent device by which to attenuate managerial 
opportunistic behaviour. Research on executive remuneration, however, has largely 
focused on the senior executives of large public limited companies (e.g. Main et al., 
1996; Conyon, 1998). Although Ingham and Thompson (1995a) examine the pay-
performance relationship in mutual companies, there is nevertheless still a paucity of 
research examining the role of executive remuneration in mutual companies.  
Unlike public limited companies, mutual companies do not have tradable property 
rights and so they face weaker market controls (Ingham and Thompson, 1995a). Other 
corporate governance devices therefore take on a more important role in attenuating 
managerial opportunistic behaviour. The Board of Directors, for example, plays an 
important role in monitoring the behaviour of senior executives (Jensen, 1993; John 
and Senbet, 1998). It is also important that Board members are remunerated in such a 
way as to serve owners’ interests by monitoring senior executives for opportunistic 
behaviour. Clearly, non-executive Directors have an important role to play in this 
respect (see e.g. Hart, 1995 and Ezzamel and Watson, 1997), and an important issue 
relates to the remuneration and incentive structures offered to non-executive directors 
(such as the Chair of the Board of a mutual building society for example) as opposed 
to executive directors. This issue is likely to be even more important in mutual 
building societies, however, as it is not clear that members (owners) interests are best 
served by an ethos of profit maximisation. To date, however, there has been no 4
research examining the link (if any) between the remuneration of the Board of 
Directors, the Chair of the Board of Directors and the performance of mutual firms. 
This paper seeks to add to the literature in four ways. First, the measure of 
remuneration employed includes: salary, profit-related-pay, bonuses, pensions, and 
any other benefits whereas Ingham and Thompson’s (1995a) measure, for example, 
includes the salary component only. The inclusion of these additional components is 
important because they may be used to align managers’ interests with those of the 
owners. Second, the relationship between the mean remuneration of the Board of 
Directors and the performance of mutual firms is explored. Third, the relationship 
between the remuneration of the Chair of the Board of Directors and the performance 
of mutual firms is explored. Finally, total factor productivity (TFP) is used as an 
alternative measure of performance because members are both customers (borrowers 
and lenders) and owners and do not receive a dividend from profits. Consequently, if 
managers maximise profits it may not be in the best interests of the members. Thus, 
building society members may be concerned with the ‘best practice’ utilisation of 
resources in order to reduce costs and to facilitate a narrowing of the margin between 
deposit and lending rates. However, given the dispersed nature of the ownership 
structure in mutual building societies, it does not necessarily follow that the member’s 
concern with the “best practice” utilisation of resources can be translated into 
managerial objectives and incentive structures. This problem may well be exacerbated 
by the relatively opaque nature of efficiency measures and TFP indices, in contrast to 
the clarity of public information such as profitability (return on assets).5
2. Corporate governance issues 
The principal-agent problem and moral hazard is at the heart of the corporate 
governance debate and the separation of ownership and control in firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Managers are employed by owners in order to manage and control 
firms’ resources on owners’ behalf. An agency relationship allows managers to 
indulge in opportunistic behaviour that serves their own interests and not necessarily 
those of owners e.g. Marris (1963) suggests that managers might empire build and 
increase the size of the firm because power and prestige are attached to managing a 
large firm. Corporate governance is concerned with how best to reduce managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour. 
Pay is a device by which owners can potentially seek to create financial incentives for 
managers to attenuate their opportunistic behaviour. Ideally, an employment contract 
setting pay equal to the marginal product of labour would be written. Company 
profitability, however, is a consequence of both managerial effort and stochastic 
factors outside of managers’ control. Thus, effort is not perfectly determinable from 
simply observing company profits. Writing employment contracts, therefore, is 
problematic due to the difficulties associated with unforeseen contingencies and the 
principal-agent problem (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
In both the US and UK, remuneration contracts for senior management contain a 
variety of components. Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that stock options, equity 
ownership, performance-related-pay and performance-related dismissals can be 
included as part of remuneration packages in order to provide financial incentives for 
value-maximising behaviour. This is problematic for mutual organisations such as 6
building societies, however, as they have no tradable property rights. In essence, the
firm does not have a market value and hence the fiduciary duty of management cannot 
be framed (via stock options and equity ownership) in terms of the maximisation of 
market value, or shareholder value, as it can in a plc firm.  
Within the context of a highly competitive financial services marketplace, and an 
equally competitive executive labour market, however, building societies might be 
expected to resort to alternative means of aligning the incentives of management with 
those of owners within the remuneration package. Clearly, one of the key elements in 
this respect might be expected to be some form of performance related remuneration. 
An unusual feature of mutuals, however, is that the customers are typically also the 
owners and are therefore at both ends of the value chain (Llewellyn, 1997). Opening a 
savings account and taking out a mortgage simultaneously confers ownership rights. 
Given that borrowers are best served by lower interest rates, while depositors are keen 
to attain higher interest rates, this implies that the owners of mutual building societies 
would generally be better off if their society operated on lower interest margins. In 
contrast, profit maximisation would tend to imply wider lending margins (subject to 
competitive conditions), and it is therefore not clear that the interests of owners and 
managers will be aligned by the use of devices such as performance related 
remuneration. 
It may well be, therefore, that any links between performance and remuneration in 
mutual building societies emanate from market pressures, both product and executive 
labour market, rather than from the usual corporate governance / agency channels. 
Hence, their particular corporate form and unique institutional arrangements, 7
combined with an increasingly competitive market environment, makes mutual 
building societies an extremely interesting sector within which to examine the 
relationship between remuneration and performance. 
A further unusual feature of UK mutual building societies is that ownership rights are 
structured on a one-member-one-vote basis irrespective of the financial stake in the 
organisation.
1 This creates a potentially severe agency problem because no individual 
has the financial incentives to monitor senior management and attempt to take 
sanctions against poorly performing management because of the costs involved and 
the small reward. Fama and Jensen (1983a, b) suggest that poorly performing 
managers are disciplined by members’ ability to liquidate their ownership stake and 
reduce resources under managers’ control. The effectiveness of this as a control 
device is questionable because individual members share of either assets or liabilities 
is normally low (Ingham and Thompson, 1995a). 
Although external takeovers can occur within the mutual sector (and the takeover has 
been used as a means to demutualise), they are quite rare because of the difficulty in 
forcing a ballot of members. Takeovers tend to be ‘friendly’ or at the instigation of the 
regulator to save poorly performing building societies in order to maintain systemic 
stability. Indeed, Thompson (1997) finds that there is little evidence of a market for 
corporate control that provides a natural selection process whereby poorly performing 
managers are replaced by superior performing managers. 
                                                          
1 This creates a more disperse ownership structure than that of mutual Savings and Loan associations in 
the US where depositors are entitled to one vote per $100 deposited up to a maximum of fifty votes 
(O’Hara, 1981). 8
The Board of Directors is the main internal control mechanism through which 
shareholders can control managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988), and, given the 
problems associated with the dispersed ownership structure, this internal control 
mechanism is particularly important in mutual building societies. It is the Board’s role 
to scrutinise the highest decision makers in the organisation (Fama, 1980; John and 
Senbet, 1998). It is, therefore, an important device in ensuring that Executive 
Directors fulfil their fiduciary duty to owners. It is often argued (in the context of plc 
institutions) that, although the Board has a fiduciary duty to protect owners’ interests, 
if they do not have a financial interest in the firm and have little to gain from 
performance gains they may not fulfil their fiduciary duty. As outlined previously, 
however, it is not self evident that this is the case with mutual building societies. 
Indeed, it might be expected that there may need to be differential incentive structures 
for executive and non-executive Directors. The pressures from competitive product 
and executive labour markets would imply a link between performance and 
remuneration for the former, while the interests of the members would probably be 
better served if this link was less strong for the latter. The non-executive Directors 
would then be better placed to curb any tendency for Executive Directors to be overly 
concerned with profitability to the detriment of the owners.  
 A detailed analysis of the relationship between Board remuneration and company 
performance, and an examination of any differences in this relationship between 
executive directors (such as the CEO) and non-executive Directors (such as the Chair) 
is therefore very important in the case of financial mutuals. 9
3. Empirical  model
In Section 2 the issue of remuneration was placed within a principal-agent setting. 
Firms’ owners attempt to write contracts that align management objectives with those 
of the owners. This can be achieved by making management’s remuneration 
dependent on firm performance (Holmstrom, 1979). The pay-performance 
relationship is typically specified in first differences (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 
Ingham and Thompson, 1995a; Main et al, 1996). This is because any changes in 
remuneration should be driven by changes in firm-level performance. In addition, it 
removes unobservable firm-specific fixed effects. The empirical framework, 
therefore, is based on a simple regression of the following form for firm i (i = 1, 2, ..., 
N) in year t (t = 1, 2, ..., T):
' ln Wit = E1 ' ln Wit-1 + E2 ' Profit + E3 ' RelProfit-1 + E4 ' ln Sizeit + Tt
+ Hit                                             (1) 
where 'is the first difference operator (i.e. ' Xit = Xit - Xit-1), Wit is executive 
remuneration (more details are in the data section below), Profit is profitability, 
RelProfit-1 is the relative profitability lagged one year, Sizeit is the size of the firm, Tt is 
a variable capturing factors common to all firms and the general trend in pay setting 
(it is estimated using a T-1 set of year dummy variables), Hit is a stochastic error term, 
and the E’s are parameters to be estimated. More comprehensive variables definitions 
can be found in Table 1.
Following Main et al. (1996) and Conyon (1998), the three measures of executive 
remuneration are lagged one year in order to capture the persistence in executive 
remuneration over the sample period. Including lagged executive remuneration also 
aids the removal of serial correlation. Relative profitability is included in the 10
regression following Gibbons and Murphy (1990) who find that relative performance 
is a significant determinant of executive remuneration. Relative profitability is 
included as a pre-dated variable because it captures the notion that managers may be 
paid for past good performance and it is less prone to endogeneity problems (Conyon, 
1998). Relative performance is only realised to pay-setters after all firms’ profitability 
is publicly available. Therefore, there may be a lag in respect of the impact of relative 
performance on executive remuneration. 
Taking natural logarithms of size scales the data and is a practice typical of 
remuneration studies of this kind, E4 is therefore interpreted as an elasticity. A 
significant and positive E4 is suggestive of managers being rewarded for pursuing size 
and growth strategies that are not necessarily in owners best interests. In contrast, 
significant and positive estimates of E2 are consistent with changes in executive 
remuneration reflecting changes in firm performance and hence managers being 
rewarded for improving firm profitability. In addition, a positive and significant E3 is 
consistent with executives being rewarded for improving firm profitability relative to 
their competitors in the same sector. 
As outlined in Section 2, the top management in joint stock organisations have a 
fiduciary duty to maximise shareholder value. Therefore, studies of joint stock 
companies have used shareholder wealth or stock market performance as a measure of 
firm performance (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996; Conyon, 1998). 
In the study of mutuals, however, share price data are unavailable. Hence, we use two 
alternative measures of performance in this analysis. First, following Ingham and 11
Thompson (1995a), profitability is employed. Second, experimentation using total 
factor productivity (TFP) change as an alternative measure is conducted. 
Although building societies, as mutual institutions, may have objectives other than 
profit maximisation, profitability has nevertheless become increasingly important for 
UK building societies in recent years. Deregulation in the financial services sector has 
resulted in building societies losing their virtual monopoly position in the mortgage 
market. Since the early 1980s banks have also been actively competing in this market. 
Building societies have also faced intense competition in the market for retail 
deposits. Hence, while building societies do have the scope to pursue objectives that 
differ somewhat from their plc competitors, this scope tends to diminish as the degree 
of competition in the key markets intensifies. It is interesting to note in this respect, 
for example, that the building societies interest rate cartel (which aimed to stabilise 
interest rates rather than maximise profits) did not survive the entry of banks into the 
mortgage market in the early 1980s. 
It is also relevant to note that many building societies have been raising funds on the 
wholesale money and bond markets since the mid-1980s. In turn, this implied that 
building societies came under market scrutiny for the first time. Indeed, many of the 
larger building societies opted for formal credit ratings in order to allow them to 
access wholesale funds on finer terms. Hence, given this increased scrutiny by the 
financial markets, building societies have been forced to become more overtly profit 
conscious in recent decades. Finally, it has often been argued that, in the absence of a 
clear profit motive, building societies traditionally followed an objective of asset 
growth. Even this objective cannot be divorced from the issue of profitability, 12
however, given the mutual status of building societies. Specifically, given a binding 
regulatory capital to assets ratio requirement, and a general inability to raise external 
capital (i.e., via the issue of equity), any given target growth rate of assets would 
imply a required post tax rate of return on assets. This would ensure that the 
appropriate level of capital, or reserves in the case of building societies, supported the 
expanded balance sheet. 
Finally, it is important to note that our sample period of 1991 to 1996 covers the 
period just prior to the “conversion wave” in which most of the larger building 
societies utilised the option, provided in the 1986 Building Societies Act, of 
converting from mutual to plc bank status. Clearly, this conversion process would be 
expected to result in building societies becoming more overtly profit oriented. It has 
also been argued, by Drake and Llewellyn (1998) for example, that many building 
societies came under pressure from their members to convert because building 
societies had hitherto been overly concerned with profitability. The consequence of 
this was the accumulation of excessive capital (reserves), relative to capital adequacy 
and growth requirements, the value of which could only be released to members via 
the plc conversion option.
When TFP is used as a measure of performance the following model is estimated: 
' ln Wit = E1 ' ln Wit-1 + E2 TFPchit-1 + E3 ' ln Sizeit + Tt + Hit                       (2) 
where TFPchit-1 is Malmquist TFP change index lagged one year and the other 
variables are defined above. TFP change is calculated using Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), which is a non-parametric approach that involves comparing each 
individual firm to an efficient frontier that is constructed using all the firms in the 13
sample. This TFP change index is, therefore, a relative measure and is included in the 
model in the same manner as relative profitability in equation (1). Hence, in a similar 
fashion to relative profitability in equation (1) it also captures the notion of managers 
being rewarded for past good relative performance and alleviates a potential 
endogeneity problem. More details of the of Malmquist TFP change index and how it 
is calculated can be found in the appendix. 
In order to examine which measure of firm-level performance is dominant, models are 
estimated that include both profitability and the Malmquist TFP change index. 
Relative profitability is not included in this model because TFP is a relative measure 
of performance. Thus a model of the following specification is also estimated: 
' ln Wit = E1 ' ln Wit-1 + E2 ' Profit + E3 ' TFPchit-1 + E4 ' ln Sizeit + Tt
+ Hit                                             (3) 
4. Data 
The data is a sample of UK building societies taken from the Thesys database. The 
UK building society is similar to the US mutual savings and loan institution. 
Although deregulation has allowed building societies to broaden their activities, 
building societies still produce remarkably homogenous outputs because of their focus 
on their core activity i.e. mortgage lending (Ingham and Thompson, 1995b). The 
database contains only those societies with assets greater than £100 million. The 
Thesys database contains 82 firms (almost the entire population of building societies 
in the UK) but is restricted to 46 firms because DEAP 2.1 (the computer programme 
used to calculate the Malmquist TFP change indices) requires a balanced panel and 14
because there are some missing observations in respect of the remuneration data.
2
Some missing observations have been filled, however, using company reports. Data 
for these 46 firms are obtained for the 1991 and 1996 period. 
We employ three remuneration variables in our analysis: that of the highest paid 
director (HPD); the remuneration of the Chairperson of the Board of Directors 
(Chair), and finally the mean level of Board remuneration for a society (Dir).
3
Although the HPD variable is employed in Ingham and Thompson’s (1995) analysis, 
an analysis of the determinants of the Chair’s remuneration and Dir in UK building 
societies is unique to this study. The executive remuneration literature has tended to 
focus on the HPD (typically the Chief Executive Officer), however, this post title 
(along with the Chair of the Board) describes the administrative responsibilities of 
two members of the Board and final decision-making rests with the Board as a whole 
(Main et al., 1996). Thus, the relationship between the remuneration of the Board of 
Directors as a whole and the performance of firms is important in order to establish 
whether the Board of Directors has a financial incentive to behave in owners’ best 
interests. Indeed, Hart (1995) argues that it is important that both executive and non-
executive directors have such financial incentives. 
Another key feature of the remuneration data is that, whereas Ingham and Thompson 
(1995a) use salary as their measure of remuneration, the measure used in this study is 
broader as it includes salary, profit-related-pay, bonuses, pensions, and any other 
benefits. The inclusion of these other components is important because they may be 
                                                          
2 An explanation of how to use DEAP 2.1 can be found in Coelli (1996). 
3 For one particular society the remuneration for the chairperson of the board is unavailable for one 
year. Hence, regressions where the dependent variable is “Chairperson’s remuneration” use 5 years of 
data for this firm and 6 years of data for the remaining firms. 15
used by the owners of firms to align senior executives objectives with those of the 
owners themselves. 
Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and definitions of variables used 
in the analysis are in Table 1. The variables are deflated using a GDP deflator found 
in economics trends (1995=100). Details on the variables used in the DEA analysis 
are provided in the Appendix.
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
5. Results
First-differencing leads to the lagged dependent variable in equations (1) and (2) 
above being correlated with the error term and is therefore a potential source of bias 
(Nickell, 1981). This problem is overcome by estimating the models using the 
generalised method of moments technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
This involves instrumenting the lagged dependent variable, which is in first-
differenced form, using the additional instruments of the lags of the remuneration 
variables in levels. Crucially, this requires the absence of serial correlation in the error 
term in order for consistent estimators to be obtained. This is indicated by no evidence 
of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced error term (Arellano and 
Bond (1998).
The results of the regressions relating to: the emoluments of the HPD; the mean 
Board remuneration, and the remuneration of the Chairperson are reported in Tables 
2, 3, and 4, respectively. The coefficient estimates presented in each table are short-16
run estimates and are converted to long-run estimates by dividing them by (1 - E1),
where E1 is the coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable. In each table, 
column 1 reports results where profitability is used as the firm-level performance 
indicator and column 2 reports results where the Malmquist TFP change index is used 
as the firm-level performance indicator. Column 3 reports results where both 
profitability and the Malmquist TFP change index lagged one period are incorporated 
as performance indicators.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Results for the HPD regressions (Table 2) indicate that the three models perform well 
according to the diagnostic tests. There is no significant evidence of serial correlation 
and the instruments pass the Sargan exogeneity test. The included time dummies, 
capturing unobserved factors affecting all firms, are significant at the 1% level and the 
Wald tests indicate that the slope coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 1% 
levels for the models in column 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
All models reported in Table 2 indicate that size (growth) has a significant impact on 
the HPDs' pay. Columns 1, 2, and 3 indicate that the long run elasticity of HPD pay 
with respect to size is 0.251, 0.209, and 0.243. Interestingly, this elasticity is 
reasonably close to the elasticity reported for large public companies. Main et al.
(1996), for example, report an elasticity of 0.31 and Conyon (1998) reports an 
elasticity of about 0.15. There is stark contrast, however, with the results of Ingham 
and Thompson (1995a) who find that this elasticity has a negative sign. This 17
difference in results may be attributable, at least in part, to the fact that Ingham and 
Thompson (1995a) specify the size variable in levels rather than in first-differences.
Column 1 of Table 2 indicates a strong relationship between profitability and the pay 
of the HPD. The long run return to a 1% increase in profitability as a proportion of 
total assets is 0.283%. For the mean HPD this leads to a £39,741 increase in pay. The 
rate of return reported here is much stronger than the 0.021% found by Ingham and 
Thompson (1995a). There are two possible explanations for this. First, Ingham and 
Thompson (1995a) use an earlier sampling time frame (1986 to 1990), whereas the 
time frame used in this study is 1991 to 1996. As emphasised previously, UK building 
societies have tended to place increasing emphasis on profitability in the post-
deregulation era. Second, our measure of remuneration is broader, indeed, it includes 
components designed to increase the sensitivity between pay and performance and 
therefore to motivate top executives. It is interesting to note, however, that relative 
profitability appears to have no statistically significant effect on HPD pay.
The coefficient for the Malmquist TFP change index reported in Column 2 has a 
negative sign. This suggests that pay increases are negatively related to changes in 
productivity. This appears to contradict the profitability result in Column 1. It could 
be that the HPD is seeking to increase profitability because their pay is linked to it but 
are not concerned about TFP change because their pay is not linked to it. TFP change, 
however, is a measure of resource utilisation and the results are consistent with the 
HPD increasing profitability at the expense of resource utilisation and, consequently, 
at the expense of members.  18
The coefficient estimates for profitability and TFP change reported in column’s 1 and 
2, respectively, appear to be fairly robust given that there are only small changes 
when they are both included in the same model, see column 3. In this case, the long 
run rate of return on HPD pay for a 1% increase in profitability is 0.308%. For the 
mean HPD this leads to a £43,252 increase in pay.
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The results in Table 3 are reported without time dummies because a Wald test of the 
time dummies (Time) indicates that they are not statistically significant at the 10% 
level. There is no significant evidence of serial correlation and the instruments pass 
the Sargan exogeneity test in all three models. Wald tests of the joint significance of 
the slope coefficients indicate that they are significant at the 1% level in all three 
models.
The results in column 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3 indicate a long-run elasticity of Dir with 
respect to firm size of 1.242, 1.214, and 0.578, respectively. The models in columns 1 
and 2 suggest that an increase in the size of a society leads to a proportionately larger 
increase in the mean remuneration of a director on the Board of Directors. There is no 
evidence of a relationship between Dir and profitability and Dir and TFP change in 
any of the models estimated. There is evidence, however, of a small positive 
relationship between relative profitability that is significant at the 10% level. In the 
long run, a 1% increase in society profitability relative to the industry average leads to 
a 0.003% increase in the change in Dir. For the mean director this means an increase 
in pay of £141.573.19
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The Chair regressions presented in Table 4 indicate that there is no persistence in 
Chair pay because the lagged dependent variable is not significant at the 10% level. 
They are reported, however, for consistency with the results presented when HPD and 
Dir are the dependent variables. All models in Table 4 appear to perform well 
according to diagnostic tests. Indeed, there is no evidence of serial correlation, the 
instruments pass the Sargan exogeneity test, and the Wald test of the joint significance 
of the slope coefficients indicate that they are significant at the 1% level. 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 4 indicate that the elasticity of Chair with respect to size 
is 0.294, 0.388, and 0.348, respectively. The results in column 1 indicate that there is 
a negative relationship between profitability and Chair pay. In the long run, a 1% 
increase in profitability as a proportion of total assets leads to a 0.240% decline in 
Chair pay. Thus, for the mean Chair of a Board a 1% increase in profitability leads to 
a £8326.08 decline in pay. This suggests that the Chair, who is a non-executive 
Director, has a remuneration scheme with less emphasis on performance related pay 
than that for the HPD, who is an executive director. There are two possible 
interpretations of this result. First, the Chair will not have a financial incentive to 
monitor executive directors effectively because he/she will have no personal financial 
gain from improvements in firm performance. Hart (1995) suggests this as one 
possible reason for non-executive directors being ineffective at monitoring executive 
Directors behaviour. Second, it supports the hypothesis made earlier that, given the 
unusual ownership structure in financial mutuals, there may be a particular need for 20
non-executive Directors to ensure that executive Directors act in the interests of all 
members and are not overly concerned with profitability. Notwithstanding these 
arguments, the significant negative coefficient on profitability is not robust to 
different model specifications because it is not significant in column 3 where TFPcht-1
is included instead of RelProft-1.
The results in column 1 of Table 4 indicates that the relationship between Chair and 
profitability relative to the industry mean is positive and indicates that a 1% increase 
in relative profitability leads to a 0.001% increase in Chair. This is a £34.692 increase 
in pay for the mean Chair of a Board of Directors.  
6. Conclusions 
This study seeks to add to our understanding of the relationship between the 
emoluments of top management (more particularly, the highest paid director, the 
Chairperson of the Board, and the Board of Directors remuneration) and the firm-
level performance of UK building societies. This is the first study to examine the 
empirical relationship between Chair remuneration, Board remuneration and the 
performance of mutual firms. We employ a broader measure of remuneration and a 
later sampling period than the previous study by Ingham and Thompson (1995a). Our 
measure of remuneration includes performance related components. By employing 
such a measure of remuneration we are able to provide further insight into the ability 
of contracting to align managers’ interests with those of the owners’. 
The results for the highest paid director provide some support for pay being 
determined by profitability. The rate of return on profitability is up to 0.308% 21
indicating a £43,252 increase in pay for a 1% increase in profitability for the mean 
highest paid director. This is higher than that reported by Ingham and Thompson 
(1995a) who find no statistical relationship between profitability and the highest paid 
director’s pay, but is smaller than that for public limited companies. Main et al
(1996), for example, report a 0.894% rate of return on highest paid director pay for a 
1% increase in shareholder wealth. Executive pay in public limited companies, 
however, can be linked to company performance via share options that are not 
available in mutual firms.  
This result is potentially “double-edged”, however, because it indicates that building 
societies are operating in a more competitive environment and are therefore becoming 
more conscious of firm profitability. Excessive profits, however, may be retained and 
utilised to fund unprofitable growth. Indeed, this is consistent with results showing a 
negative relationship between mean highest paid director’s pay and TFP change 
because TFP is an index measure of resource utilisation, unlike profitability.  
The elasticity of the highest paid director’s pay with respect to size (which is reported 
to be up to 0.251) is of a similar size to that reported for public limited companies 
(e.g. Main et al, 1996; Conyon, 1998) indicating that size is an important determinant 
of pay-setting in mutuals as well as for public companies. Our results contradict 
Ingham and Thompson (1995a) who report a negative sign on the elasticity of the 
highest paid director’s pay with respect to size. This could be due to size being 
included in our model in first-difference form while in Ingham and Thompson 
(1995a) it is included in levels. The difference in results could also be due to the 
different sampling periods utilised. The results of this study are based on a later 22
sampling period to that of Ingham and Thompson (1995a) and size may have become 
a more important feature of executive pay setting in mutuals because mutuals are 
operating in a more competitive managerial labour market. 
For the mean remuneration of the Board of Directors, the size of the building society 
appears to be a particularly important and large determinant of pay with a long-run 
elasticity of up to 1.242. Results for UK joint stock firms indicate an elasticity of 
about 0.3 or lower (e.g. Main et al, 1996). No statistically significant relationship 
between pay and either of our performance measures (profitability and TFP change) is 
found. There is, however, a very weak relationship between last year’s relative 
profitability and the contemporaneous pay of the mean director. The long-run rate of 
return on relative profitability is 0.003%. This lack of financial incentive is an 
important reason for the ineffectiveness of the Board of Directors as a device for 
monitoring executive directors performance (Hart, 1995). 
For the Chairperson of the Board of Directors the elasticity of pay with respect to size 
is estimated to be up to 0.388. There is no evidence that TFP change is a determinant 
of the Chair’s pay. There is, however, evidence of a negative relationship between 
profitability with the rate of return on profitability being –0.240%. In contrast, last 
year’s relative profitability yields a positive rate of return of 0.001% for the 
contemporaneous pay of the Chair. Hence, the latter effect is dominated by the 
negative rate of return on profitability. This suggests that the Chairperson of the 
Board of Directors does not have a financial interest in improving the profitability of 
the firm, which is of serious concern from a corporate governance perspective 
because the Chair holds a key position on the Board of Directors and the result 23
indicates that they have no financial incentive to perform their function of monitoring 
executive directors effectively. 
The incentive structure of non-executive directors in mutuals, however, may need to 
be different to that of the Chief Executive Officer (and other executive directors) in 
order to ensure that profitability is not pursued to the detriment of members’ interests. 
Indeed, this, together with the fact that the Boards of building societies are composed 
of a mix of executive and non-executive directors, may help to explain the marked 
difference between the highest paid director and Board of Director results. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that there is a strong relationship between executive 
remuneration and the size of UK building societies, particularly for the mean member 
of the Board of Directors of a society. This is consistent with managerial theories of 
the firm (e.g. Marris, 1963) with the pay-setting structure leading to senior executives 
being rewarded for pursuing the increased size of the firm. The evidence concerning 
the pay-performance relationship is mixed; however, there is a strong relationship 
between the remuneration of the highest paid director and profitability.
The results of this study are consistent with a movement towards pay in mutuals being 
determined more similarly to pay in public limited companies i.e. executive pay has a 
similar relationship with size and performance. This could be due to deregulation in 
the mortgage market and increased competition, as well as the fact that building 
societies have come under greater market scrutiny in bond and subordinated debt 
markets, and due to the “plc conversion wave” of the 1990s. Additionally, there may 24
be increased mobility in the managerial labour market leading to a convergence in 
pay-setting practices between mutuals and public limited companies. 25
Appendix
A definition of the output-orientated Malmquist TFP change index and a brief 
explanation of how it is calculated are provided in this section. The Malmquist 
productivity index is a ratio of distance functions (Caves et al., 1982). Fare et al.
(1994) and Coelli (1996) define the output-orientated Malquist TFP change index for 
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where x is a vector of inputs and y is a vector of outputs. This TFP change variable is 
the geometric mean of two distance functions that are output orientated Malmquist 
TFP indices calculated for period t and period t+1 using the non-parametric Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach. DEA involves comparing each individual 
firm to an efficient frontier that is constructed from all the firms in any given year in 
the sample. The Malmquist TFP change index captures both technical efficiency and 
technical progress. Note that an index value greater than one indicates positive TFP 
growth while a value less than one indicates negative growth. More in depth details 
on how it is calculated can be found in Caves et al. (1982) and Fare et al. (1994). 26
TFPch is calculated using the DEAP 2.1 computer program (Coelli, 1996). Four 
inputs are in the input vector x: full time equivalent staff employed (x1), the net book 
value of fixed assets (x2), retail funds (x3), and non-retails funds (x4). The output 
vector y contains three output variables: advances secured on land and property and 
other commercial assets (y1), total liquid assets (y2), and other income (y3).
Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation ) of these variables are in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 27
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Pay Regressions 
Variable Definition  Mean  Standard  Deviation 
HPD highest paid director emoluments (£ 
thousands)
140.428 87.433 
Dir mean director emoluments i.e. total 
board remuneration / number of 
board members (£ thousands) 
47.191 33.332 
Chair chair emoluments (£ thousands)  34.692  33.279 
Prof profit on ordinary activities / total 
assets (%) 
0.609 0.194 
RelProf relative profitability i.e. firm Prof in 
year t / industry Prof in year t (% of 
mean) 
100 31.158 
TFPch output-orientated Malmquist total 
factor productivity change (Index) 
1.113 0.316 
Size total assets (£ thousands)  5584418.259  13834080.03 
Note: TFPch is included as a change variable rather than in levels like the other 
variables because it is calculated as a ratio of two distance functions. The other 
variables are calculated as a change by first-differencing. 31
Table 2 
Highest Paid Director (HPD) Regressions 
Independent variables  Dependent variable: ' ln HPDit





























Serial correlation -0.915 -0.697  -0.841 
Time dummies 
included
yes yes  yes 
Time 168.847 (0.000)  57.941 (0.000)  155.012 (0.000) 
Wald 24.629 (0.000)  8.832 (0.032)  43.102 (0.000) 
Sargan 13.681 (0.622)  6.035 (0.197)  14.190 (0.585) 
Observations  184 184  184 
Notes: (i) Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. (ii) ' ln HPD and 
' Prof are treated as endogenous. In columns (1) and (3) lags of ln HPD and Prof from t-2 to 
t-4 are used as instruments while in column (2) ln HPD lags from t-3 to t-4 are used as 
instruments. Models are estimated by GMM using the Arellano and Bond (1998) DPD98 
package. (iii) Serial correlation is an Arellano and Bond (1991) test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals, distributed N(0, 1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. (iv) Time is a Wald test statistic of the joint significance of the time dummies with 
the probability value reported in parentheses. (v) Wald is a Wald test statistic of the joint 
significance of the explanatory variables (excluding time dummies and constant) with the 
probability value reported in parentheses. (vi) Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions 
distributed as chi-squared with as many degrees of freedom as there are over-identifying 
restrictions. The null hypothesis is of instrument validity with the probability value in 
parentheses.32
Table 3 
Mean Board Regressions 
Independent variables  Dependent variable: ' ln Dirit
 1  2  3 






















Serial correlation 1.589 0.306 0.399 
Time dummies included  no no no 
Time 5.706 (0.222)  1.791 (0.774)  0.485 (0.975) 
Wald 102.079 (0.000)  67.579 (0.000)  78.615 (0.000) 
Sargan 9.606 (0.651)  1.586 (0.811)  11.695 (0.470) 
Observations  184 184 184 
Notes: (i) Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. (ii) ' ln HPD and 
' Prof are treated as endogenous. In columns (1), (2) and (3) lags of ln HPD from t-3 to t-4 
are used as instruments while in columns (1) and (3) Prof lagged from t-2 to t-4 are used as 
instruments. Models are estimated by GMM using the Arellano and Bond (1998) DPD98 
package. (iii) Serial correlation is an Arellano and Bond (1991) test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals, distributed N(0, 1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. (iv) Time is a Wald test statistic of the joint significance of the time dummies with 
the probability value reported in parentheses. (v) Wald is a Wald test statistic of the joint 
significance of the explanatory variables (excluding time dummies and constant) with the 
probability value reported in parentheses. (vi) Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions 
distributed as chi-squared with as many degrees of freedom as there are over-identifying 




Independent variables  Dependent variable: ' ln Chairit





























Serial correlation -0.609 -0.407 -0.481 
Time dummies included  yes yes yes 
Time 26.414 (0.000)  8.914 (0.063)  12.702 (0.013) 
Wald 23.495 (0.000)  8.904 (0.031)  13.874 (0.008) 
Sargan 15.558 (0.212)  5.443 (0.245)  13.004 (0.369) 
Observations 183  183  183 
Notes: (i) Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. (ii) ' ln HPD and 
' Prof are treated as endogenous. In columns (1), (2) and (3) lags of ln HPD from t-3 to t-4 
are used as instruments while in column (1) and (3) Prof lagged from t-2 to t-4 are used as 
instruments. Models are estimated by GMM using the Arellano and Bond (1998) DPD98 
package. (iii) Serial correlation is an Arellano and Bond (1991) test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals, distributed N(0, 1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. (iv) Time is a Wald test statistic of the joint significance of the time dummies with 
the probability value reported in parentheses. (v) Wald is a Wald test statistic of the joint 
significance of the explanatory variables (excluding time dummies and constant) with the 
probability value reported in parentheses. (vi) Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions 
distributed as chi-squared with as many degrees of freedom as there are over-identifying 
restrictions. The null hypothesis is of instrument validity with the probability value in 
parentheses.34
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used to Calculate the Malmquist TFP Change 
Index
Variable  Mean (£ thousands)  Standard Deviation (£ thousands) 
x1 1315.371 3101.782 
x2 54043.484 120292.886 
x3 4032288.161 10117933 
x4 1007320.705 2290948.794 
y1 4409709.957 10927982.34 
y2 975457.554 2349278.955 
y3 39758.846 100722.008 